# 1NC

***[****To negate means ‘to deny the existence, evidence, or truth of’[[1]](#footnote-1) so presume neg because a statement is more likely to be invalid or false than true.****]***

***[****Ought implies a moral obligation[[2]](#footnote-2) so I value morality.****]***

The meta-ethic is expressivism. Normative statements are tied to the attitudes of a speaker. They aren’t descriptive. **Chrisman[[3]](#footnote-3):**

In ethical expressivism, however, these ideas become more concrete and precise. The view is basically that, **as descriptive claims express factual beliefs, ethical claims express** a distinctive **nonrepresentational** kind of **mental state[s]** – what we might call a “pro-/con-attitude”, “conative state”, or even an evaluative “belief” (as long as we distinguish this from a descriptive belief)3. Whatever we call it, the idea is that ethical judgments have, at least in part, a desire-like “direction of fit” with the world.4 Some metaethicists endorse ethical **expressivism** because they think it **makes the best sense of the** distinctive **way ethical claims are connected to action.** Here, expressivists argue that **there is a special** “internal” **connection between ethical claim-making and action, such that we expect someone who sincerely makes a ethical claim**, which bears on their own actions, **to be at least somewhat motivated to act in a way that accords with the claim**. Insofar as we accept a belief-desire psychology of action, the most parsimonious place to locate the desire-like element needed to explain this internal connection would be in the mental state expressed by the ethical claim itself. Hence, expressivists think this mental state is distinct from the sorts of factual beliefs expressed by descriptive claims. **Another reason** to endorse **[is that]** ethical expressivism is that it comports with a thoroughgoing naturalism. Here, expressivists argue that ontological commitment to **ethical properties generate**s **metaphysical and episteme[ic]**ological **puzzles. If** one thinks **ethical properties are identical to** (or even just constituted by) **natural properties, then one is committed to a metaphysical reduction which is hard to pull off. If one thinks ethical properties are not identical** to (or constituted by) natural properties, then one is committed to a type of property, **knowledge** of which **is difficult to explain**. Moreover, many philosophers hold that, in some sense, the ethical supervenes on the natural; but this relation is hard to explain if ethical properties are irreducible to natural properties. Expressivists argue that **these puzzles can be avoided by viewing ethical claims as expressing mental states which are not conceived of as representing the way the world is but** as putting a special sort of **pressure on** motivation to **action.**

***[And,*** *meta-ethics precede other normative justification for framework:* ***A)*** *they determine the pre-requisites for normative theories in the first place; if naturalism is true then moral states are factual but if non-naturalism is true they’re intuitional, and* ***B)*** *a system of morality that is inconsistent with the meta-ethical view becomes internally incoherent because its premises contradict higher metaphysical truths.****]***

**And,** neuroscience proves that morality is an emotive process. **Greene[[4]](#footnote-4):**

As noted above, recent evidence from **neuroscience and** neighbouring **[other] disciplines indicate**s that **moral judgement is** often an intuitive, **emotional** matter. Although many moral judgements are difficult, much moral judgement is **accomplished in an intuitive**, effortless **way**. An interesting feature of many intuitive, effortless cognitive processes is that they are accompanied by a perceptual phenomenology. For example, humans can effortlessly determine whether a given face is male or female without any knowledge of how such judgements are made. When you look at someone, you have no experience of working out whether that person is male or female. You just see that person’s maleness or femaleness. By contrast, you do not look at a star in the sky and see that it is receding. One can imagine creatures that automatically process spectroscopic redshifts, but as humans we do not. All of this makes sense from an evolutionary point of view. **We have evolved mechanisms for making** quick, **emotion-based** social **judgements, for** ‘seeing’ **rightness and wrongness**, **because our** intensely social **lives favour such capacities**, but there was little selective pressure on our ancestors to know about the movements of distant stars. We have here the beginnings of a debunking explanation of moral realism: **we believe in moral realism because moral experience has a perceptual phenomenology**, and moral experience has a perceptual phenomenology because natural selection has **outfitted** us **with mechanisms for** making intuitive, **emotion-based moral judgements**, much as it has outfitted us with mechanisms for making intuitive, emotion-based judgements about who among us are the most suitable mates. Therefore, **we** can **understand our inclination towards moral realism** not as an insight into the nature of moral truth, but **as a by-product of the efficient cognitive processes we use to make moral decisions**.

**So,** the standard is consistency with emotive expression. Neuroscientific evidence proves that emotions are retributive. **Pardo and Patterson[[5]](#footnote-5):**

He next examines “the psychology of the People endorse both consequentialist and retributivist justifications for punishment in the criminal punisher,” and summarizes as follows: abstract, but in practice, or when faced with more concrete hypothetical choices, **people’s motives** appear to be **[are] emotionally driven**. People **[they] punish in proportion to the extent that transgressions make them angry.**40 Assuming it is true that people’s punishment decisions are “predominantly emotional”; “driven by feeling of anger”; proportional with that feeling; and generally more **consistent with retributivism** than consequentalism—what normative conclusions follow from such facts? As a practical matter, as Paul Robinson has argued, any proposed legal reform would be wise to take account of these facts.41 Moreover, punishment decisions that deviated too far from the judgments of what most citizens think are fair may face a legitimacy problem[s]. But these facts by themselves do not yet pose a normative challenge to retributivism per se. The crucial move in presenting such a challenge is to link retributivism with deontology. “Deontologists,” Greene contends, “argue that **the primary justification for punishment is retribution**”42 **and** that “**people’s** deontological and **retributive punitive judgments are primarily emotional**.”43 Deontological judgments are **produced by the “emotional” psychological process** rather than the “cognitive” process, and consequentialist judgments are produced by the cognitive process. The cognitive process is more likely to involve “genuine moral reasoning,” as opposed to the “quick,” “automatic,” and “alarm-like” deontological judgments produced by emotional responses. The supposed normative implications of this empirical information are to undermine deontology as “a rationally coherent moral theory”;44 an “attempt to reach moral conclusions on the basis of moral reasoning”; “a school of normative moral thought”; and as reflecting any “deep, rationally discoverable moral truths.”45 Rather, deontology is portrayed as merely an attempt to rationalize our emotional responses, which are based on, and may have developed evolutionarily because of, non-moral factors. And the same goes for retributivism: “**when we feel the pull of retributivist theories of punishment, we are merely gravitating toward our evolved emotional inclinations** and not toward some independent moral truth.”

**And,** put away your turns. People don’t care about the negative consequences of punishment or the guilt of the offender. **Carlsmith et al[[6]](#footnote-6):**

However, a close examination of these responses reveals a more complicated picture. As Vidimar and Miller (1980) discussed, **when supporters of deterrence** theory **are provided with** incontrovertible **evidence on** the **[its] inefficacy** of deterrence, **their attitudes** regarding capital punishment **do not change** (Elsewroth and Ross, 1983). This strongly suggests that the basis for these attitudes may well be rooted in something other than deterrence. Moreover, Tyler and Weber (1983) tested certain hypotheses that follow from the behavioral-control model and found no support. Specifically, they found that **fear of crime**, evaluation of the crime rate, **or** having been a victim of **rule breaking are not** strong **predictors of punitiveness**, casting doubts on wholly utilitarian accounts of why people punish. Numerous **other studies** indirectly **suggest that** the motivation for punishment may be rooted in nonutilitarian motives. In a series of four experiments, Alicke (1992) showed that people are inclined to attribute causal responsibility for a negative event to the most morally blameworthy of multiple factors. He found that **people blame the driver of an accident rather other plausible factors** (e.g. **[such as] an oil slick**, a blind intersection, another driver) when that driver was on an immoral errand but not when he or she was on a moral errand. The fact that culpability and punishment are closely linked to the morality of the action suggests that punishment in these cases is driven by just desert motives. **Recent work** by Tetlock and colleagues (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996) **identifies moral outrage as a critical component in the determination of punishment**. These authors have shown that taboo trade offs such as ascertaining the fiscal value of citizenship, body parts, or happy relationships give rise to strong and immediate actions of moral outrage. Fiske and Tetlock (1997) asserted that measures of moral outrage substantially predict punitiveness and punitive intent. Extending this work, Lerner, Goldberg, and Tetlock (1998) found that factors associated with just deserts and moral outrage **[it] contribute[s] substantially** to attributions of responsibility and **to punitive behavior**. In their studies, anger (a component of moral outrage) provoked in an unrelated domain significantly predicted punishment but was mediated by accountability. These results are consistent with other theorizing (e.g. Fiske & Tetlock, 1997) that the just deserts motive is composed of both affective and cognitive components, and it reinforces the observation that anger is of central importance in punitiveness. This research is consistent with the hypothesis that lay theories of punishment are rooted in just deserts but does not test whether people are equally motivated by other, more utilitarian factors.

**So,** I negate.

# Frontlines

## Framework Overview

**1. Cross apply Greene:** neuroscience proves that people respond to moral problems based on emotional chemical reactions in the brain. Neuroscientific evidence comes first on framework. **A)** it’s the best objective measure of how people work with moral processes, and provides the best access we have to independent normative truth, and **B)** any system of morality that isn’t consistent with our neurological makeup will inevitably fail because biology will force us to contradict it.

**2.** Emotivism controls the internal link to the functioning of your normative system – if we can’t condemn or show our disapproval for certain actions then we have no way of expressing which claims are inherently good or bad. That’s key to people following your ethic’s rules.

**3. Cross apply Chrisman:** Emotivism precludes the AC framework. **A)** Ethical properties must at least be somewhat in line with our dispositions and attitudes, or people will never act on them in the first place, **B)** moral facts aren’t reducible to natural or non-natural facts, because neither is holistic or epistemically accessible, so they have to be projected onto the world by the speaker.

**4. Greene** makes a genealogical claim that systems of morality only exist because they are in line with the evolutionary impulses that are remnants of our emotive makeup. Any system of morality that isn’t immediately based in emotion is just an illusion.

## Contention Weighing Overview

**1. Pardo and Patterson** outweighs on specificity – they directly correlated people’s emotive reaction to retribution and do so using precise neuroscientific tests. That’s the best indicator of how people feel – your opinion to something that’s a gut-check isn’t something you know until the moment it occurs.

**2.** Other ways of telling how people feel are susceptible to lies and mischaracterization. People can always change or manipulate the data, or tell researchers the wrong thing because their self-conscious or otherwise biased. Neuroscience is the best gauge of emotion because it’s unbiased and objective.

**3. Pardo and Patterson** takes out your offense. Reactions that endorse consequentialist approaches to punishment aren’t emotive or psychological but rather cognitive, rational processes. They don’t link to my standard because they’re rational ways of assessing action, not irrational emotive ones.

**4.** Other ways of assessing emotion are subject to change overtime based on environmental factors and opinion. They aren’t objective ways of predicting how people will feel in the future. Whereas, neuroscience provides the best access to how people will always feel because such emotions are natural facts about our brain chemistry that exist across all persons.

**5. Carlsmith** makes an internal weighing claim about which emotions come first. Even if people feel some sort of sympathy for offenders that doesn’t eclipse their anger. The neurological studies highlighted in Carlsmith identify anger as the most important and central emotion for determining how and why we punish, so it comes first for justifying which policies we use.

**6. Carlsmith** indicates any rehabilitative policy can never be in line with emotive impulse. People don’t care about the offenders, helping society, or any social benefit that comes from rehab, which could be the only plausible motive for emotively wanting to help people. Retribution is the only option because it’s proven that anger is the only intuitive thing people care about.

## AT Polls

**1.** Don’t reflect true public opinion – only a portion of the population, people don’t give their actual beliefs, and data is manipulated. **Casida[[7]](#footnote-7):**

Yes, there are always predictions that can be made, but **unless [predictions]** they are **count**ing **the entire country’s population as a sample** (an impossible task), there is still a margin of error, and **that margin of error is the margin of doubt of one poll or one statistic being able to gauge public opinion**. With the humility to say that I don’t really know, and the confidence to say that they don’t really know either, I want to remind voters that **all numbers can be manipulated, all questions and data can be leading and/or deceiving, and many people who have an opinion never give it to the people asking for it**. And when the silent people of this country act, be it with their vote or their dollar, the economy and communities in which we live will respond. We will be better off for it, and we will see history being made as we change our destiny according to the people at the bottom of this pyramid. Growing up in the marketing industry, I have so much respect for people who work with public opinion – it is certainly a trade that is both interesting and useful to the marketing of products and services (and political candidates). However, as someone who has spoken with literally thousands of individuals, I feel assured in saying that **it is impossible to truly gauge public opinion in a way that captures all of the public**– so don’t give it more credit than what it is worth.

**2.** Polls are skewed by their administrators. **McGinnis[[8]](#footnote-8):**

Asking slanted questions. On far too many occasions, researchers and pollsters ask questions that skew the results. These questions can be leading and create false assumptions or false comparisons. There are a number of ways in which a skilled researcher can create a poll question so the results are all but a foregone conclusion. If the conclusions drawn from the poll or survey don’t pass the sniff test for me, this is the first place I like to look.

**3.** Polls are regionally and structurally biased – there’s always a slanted political opinion in a certain region so wherever you interview you’re getting a regional bias that skews the results.

**4.** Polls are subject to change – people change their beliefs or have different ones right now than what occurred when you asked them the question, so polls can never verify objective truth.

**5.** Polls are rational, not emotive. They don’t link to my standard. **Edlin et al[[9]](#footnote-9):**

We demonstrate that **voting is rational even in large elections if individuals have ‘social’ preferences and are concerned about social welfare.** In a large election, the probability that a vote is decisive is small, but the social benefits at stake in the election are large, and **so the expected utility benefit of voting to an individual with social preferences can be significant**. What is perhaps surprising is that the expected value of the social benefit does not approach zero or even diminish as the number of voters grows large. The key way in which we go beyond a circular argument (of the form ‘people vote because it gives them positive utility’) is that we consider **the perceived social benefit [is not]** not simply as **a psychological feature of the individual but** as **a utility that is proportional to the probability of being pivotal** (itself endogenous) and to the number of persons affected by the election under consideration. We believe that **this calculation is** roughly **consistent with the way citizens perceive voting and participation** – not simply as a (possibly) enjoyable act or as a discrete duty, but **as a potential contribution to the general good**. The larger the jurisdiction in which the election applies, the larger the potential effect of the election outcome on the general welfare.

***[Polls Negate]***

**1. T -** Americans strongly favor retributive approaches. Long-term trends with Democrats and Republicans in the legislative branch prove. **Falco and Freiburger 11[[10]](#footnote-10):**

**Over the past few decades American correctional policy has focused on a “get tough” approach toward crime and punishment.** In order to cast themselves as “tough on crime,” **both Democrats and Republicans have continuously supported measures to increase the punishment allocated to criminal offenders**. The most punitive type of punishment in the United States is arguably the death penalty. Unlike other types of punishments (such as prison or jail), the death penalty is the only punishment with a mobilized opposition that continues to fight against its use. **Political leaders, criminal justice administrators, judges, and citizen groups throughout the United States look at public opinion on capital punishment to support its continued use.** In fact, **strong public support is arguably the number one reason the death penalty continues to be used as a form of correctional policy in our criminal justice system.** Bohm (2003) argues that public support for the death penalty contributes to its continued use in at least five ways. First, **strong public support can sway legislators to vote in favor of the death penalty and against any statutes seeking its repeal.** Second, he argues that prosecutors may seek the death penalty for political rather than legal purposes. Third, it may influence judges to impose death sentences or uphold death sentences on appeal. Fourth, governors may be less likely to veto death penalty legislation or commute a death sentence due to fear of risking re-election. Lastly, and what Bohm argues is the most important, is that supreme court justices (both state and federal) examine support for the death penalty as a measure of “evolving standards of decency” to decide whether the death penalty violates the U.S. Constitution’s 8th Amendment “cruel and unusual punishment” clause.

Outweighs – **A)** more comprehensive because it takes a long term look at the polling data conducted over the years, **B)** reflects how public opinion is actually implemented in terms of policy analysis which is particularly important in terms of how the legal system functions.

**2. T -** status quo public opinion confirms – people support the death penalty and don’t want criminals rehabilitated. **Balko 11[[11]](#footnote-11):**

But a little less than two years after David Grann [made a convincing argument](http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_fact_grann" \t "_hplink) in The New Yorkerthat the state of Texas had done just that, **public support for capital punishment hasn't wavered**. In October 2009, Grann wrote about Cameron Todd Willingham, executed in 2004 for setting the fire that killed his three young children. Willingham was convicted because of forensic testimony from fire officials that arson experts call junk science. Grann's story was widely discussed and distributed, but the predicted sea change in public perceptions of the death penalty didn't happen. [According to Gallup polling](http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx" \t "_hplink)**, support for the death penalty dropped just a point between 2009 and 2010, from 65 percent to 64 percent**, well within the margin for error. And about half the country still believes the death penalty isn't used often enough. As we saw last week with [the execution of Troy Davis in Georgia](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/21/troy-davis-executed_n_975109.html" \t "_hplink), the Willingham case doesn't even seem to have made state governments less willing to execute even when there are strong doubts about the defendant's guilt. In fact, the only fallout from Willingham may in fact have been to strengthen the resolve of death penalty supporters. When the crowd at a GOP primary debate cheered the number of executions carried out in Texas earlier this month, the Willingham case and Gov. Rick Perry's handling of it was the clear subtext of the question. **There's still no political price to pay for defending executions, for carrying out questionable ones or**, in the case of Perry, for [stifling attempts to investigate](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/08/rick-perry-cameron-todd-willingham-execution_n_954197.html" \t "_hplink) **whether an innocent person has been put to death.** The states of California, Arkansas, Tennessee and Kentucky recently even resorted to purchasing sodium thiopental [on the black market](http://reason.com/archives/2011/05/23/lethal-and-illegal" \t "_hplink) to ensure they could continue carrying out lethal injections.

**And,** the motivation behind support for the death penalty is retributive. **Mandery[[12]](#footnote-12):**

This is **unquestionably** a powerful idea, and **public support for the death penalty is** – at least on the surface- largely **based on notions of retribution. In** most **polls, “an aye for an eye” or “punishment should fit the crime” is** the plurality reason **offered by proponents for their support of capital punishment**. In a 2001 Gallup poll, 48% of **respondents cited retribution as the basis for their support, more than twice the level of support offered for any other justification.**

## AT Sympathy/Compassion

**1.** Cross apply **Clark 1** - sympathetic emotions are inconsistent with our greater retributive outrage which means they must be discarded to minimize conflicts with our judgements. They’ve conceded internal weighing the card which means game over.

**2.** Sympathy for criminals isn’t an intrinsic emotion – it’s caused by external factors. **Clark 2:**

Secondly, and in response to just this point, Moore goes on to say, "…just as we discount our experience with sticks looking bent when immersed in water because we can explain the experience away, so we should discount any sympathy for disadvantaged criminals if we can explain why we feel that sympathy in terms of extraneous factors." Moore suggests two such factors: "our own guilt at not having done enough to alleviate ‘unhappy’ causes of crime, or…our sense that those who became criminals because of adverse circumstances have ‘already suffered enough’" (545)..

**3.** Those aren’t feelings of sympathy – they’re feelings of superiority. **Clark 3:**

Third and lastly, Moore says about sympathy that "..**we have reason to discount** certain **experiences** and the intuitions they generate when, on examination, **their appearance of moral goodness proves deceptive**" (545). Moore goes on to speculate that **our sympathies for disadvantaged offenders might be due not to any laudable variety of compassion, but to unconscious feelings of superiority to the offender, or** perhaps the **elitist refusals to judge others by the standards we impose on ourselves or to acknowledge the moral dignity and autonomy of others** (546).

**Cates[[13]](#footnote-13):**

There are many thinkers, however, who would regard this as anything but obvious. It is possible to make a moral judgment concerning someone'saction or character,to hold him fully responsible for a serious failure, and to feel compassion for him at the same time. It is also possible to feel compassion for someone while setting aside the question of guilt (unless that question is relevant for assessing the nature of someone's suffering and the requirements for alleviating that suffering). For example, most Buddhists believe that all sentient beings are in a state of suffering, and that a principalcause of this suffering in any given human being is his or her own ignorance about the nature of reality, and his or her ignorant desires. The implication is that all humans who suffer are partly responsible for their own suffering, such that one could never say straightforwardlythat "thisperson did not bring the suffering on himself or herself" (321). Yet most Buddhists conceive of the best sort of human life in light of the bodhisattva ideal, and most conceive of a bodhisattva as one who aspires to universal and unconditionalcompassion.The Dalai Lama, for example, thinks that what the Chinese have done to Tibet and the Tibetan people is morally reprehensible, yet he has compassion for the Chinese, including the members of the Chinese leadership, and he urges others to cultivate compassion, even as they work to defend human rights in Tibet and aroundthe world (Gyatso 1990). What is the relationship between Nussbaum's conception of compassion and what the Dalai Lama refers to by the same name?

## AT Not Everyone Feels that Way

**1.** Cross apply **Pardo and Patterson** -

**2.** Cross apply **Carlsmith** - Numerous studies have found that people don’t respond rationally to the effect of punishment on crime rates. Even when people were told that deterrence would cause more crime they still remained dedicated to their view. People have moral outrage ingrained in their psychology.

## AT Fear

**1.** People emotionally prefer retribution because it appeases feelings of fear. **Bowes[[14]](#footnote-14):**

**Every time the media flashes provocative and appalling images of crime scenes across our television sets**, **we cringe in fear and ask ourselves** the dreaded hypothetical question: **What if someone tries to harm me, or** worse yet, **my family?** Pressure is put on **government**, and they **respond by passing laws that address the fear**, not the real problem. Most **people in society do not ask about any long-term effects of the “tough on crime”** bill; **they are just satisfied that their fears are temporarily extinguished and offenders will serve a lengthy prison term for their crimes.** As **the result of our emotional approach to deterring crime**, the U.S. **[is that the] prison population has swelled to** a staggering **2.5 million people**! Can you believe that the United States incarcerates more of its own people per capita than any other country in the world? For nearly 30 years, “lock ’em up and throw away the key” has been our stance on crime. **We have abandoned rehabilitation, even for nonviolent offenses, and made criminals second-rate citizens.** Unfortunately, despite the astronomical number of criminals behind bars and the billions of dollars squandered on warehousing them, crime is still devastating our communities.

***[****Fear comes first under an emotive standard****]***

**1.** Fear is structurally activated in the brain prior to other emotional responses. **Ohman[[15]](#footnote-15):**

An evolved module for fear elicitation and fear learning with 4 characteristics is proposed, **(a) The fear module is preferentially activated in aversive contexts** **by stimuli that are fear relevant in an evolutionary perspective**, **(b) Its activation** **to such stimuli** **is automatic,** **(c) It is relatively impenetrable to cognitive control**, **(d) It originates in a dedicated neural circuitry**, centered on the amygdala**. Evidence supporting these propositions is reviewed from conditioning studies**, both in humans and in monkeys; **illusory correlation studies; studies using unreportable stimuli; and studies from animal neuroscience. The fear module is assumed to mediate an emotional level of fear learning that is relatively independent and dissociable from cognitive learning of stimulus relationships.**

**2.** Emotional moral judgments are the products of evolution – that’s the Greene evidence in the NC. Fear is the most important emotion in terms of this evolutionary development. **Ohman 2:**

**Mammalian evolution has required the successful development of defense systems to cope with dangers that threaten**ed **to disrupt the transport of genes between generations.** In the early mammalian environment of evolutionary adaptiveness (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990), **disaster could strike fast and without warning, primarily through** hunting predators but also through **aggressive conspecifics** and from physical events such as falling objects, floods, thunder and lightning, and sudden lack of oxygen. Escape and avoidance were common strategies designed by evolution to deal with such exigencies. At a minimum, **they required a perceptual system to identify threats and a reflexively wired motor system** to move the organism away from the danger. With more sophisticated nervous systems, the effectiveness could be expanded both at the sensory and the motor ends, and the relation between stimulus and response could be rendered less stereotyped by inserting a central motive state between the two. In this way, the motive state could be activated from innate danger stimuli and serve to promote escape through the flexible tailoring of responses to environmental contingencies (e.g., Archer, 1979). For example, **depending on circumstances, the animal would freeze, escape, or attack** (e.g., Blanchard & Blanchard, 1988). **It is this central motive state that we commonly identify as *fear***(e.g., Mineka, 1979; Ohman, 1993a).An essential characteristic of fear, therefore, is that it motivates avoidance and escape (Epstein, 1972). Potentially disastrous events sometimes do not strike without notice, however, but may be heralded by subtle cues. For example, to the attentive observer, a predator may announce its presence by faint sounds or odors. By using the contingency between such cues and the potentially deadly consequence, the central motive state of fear could be conditioned to the cue (e.g., Rescorla & Solomon, 1967), which would promote further flexibility in the relationships between stimulus and response. Furthermore, conditioned fear cues could recruit defensive responses in anticipation of the predator’s strike, which provides a decisive edge in the arms race between predator and prey (see Hollis, 1982). From this perspective, it is likely that survival-relevant relationships between cues and consequences could be used by natural Selection to promote their preferential and selective association in the brains of animals (e.g., Bolles, 1970; Seligman, 1970). The emergence of more advanced nervous systems assured that the outcome that evolution selected for, avoidance of potentially deadly events or situations, could be achieved through more sophisticated and selective mechanisms, such as inborn defense responses, Pavlovian conditioning, instrumental learning, and eventually cognition and conscious deliberation (e.g., Razran, 1971).Viewed from the evolutionary perspective, **fear is central to mammalian evolution. As a product of natural selection, it is shaped and constrained by evolutionary contingencies.** It is a central thesis of this article that **this evolutionary history is obvious in the fear** and phobias **exhibited and readily learned by humans.**

## AT Fallacy of Origin

**1.** The fallacy of origin is an informal fallacy, meaning it only pertains to irrelevant considerations regarding the truth or falsity of a proposition. Philosophers don’t take it seriously.

**2.** No reason why this is a fallacy – if morality is casually determined by emotions then it follows that moral rules must conform to our emotive inclinations. Emotions are intrinsically valuable.

**3.** Your framework bites too – you say that morality must be situated in X because X determines specific moral qualities about the external world. If my framework is false so is yours.

**4.** Just because a framework commits a small logical fallacy doesn’t mean the entire thing is false. It means it *might* be false because a specific conclusion in it isn’t certain. This argument is just really bad defense.

## AT Is-Ought

**1.** This argument is non-unique – all moral frameworks commit the is-ought fallacy because they necessarily derive some part of their conclusion from sensory experience about states of affairs. Either a framework can’t be applied to morality because it can’t be situated in the natural world or it commits the is-ought fallacy.

**2.** I don’t commit the is-ought fallacy. I derive morality from emotive consciousness. I don’t say that emotions *are* a certain way but that moral statements convey emotive significance and that in this situation emotions endorse retribution.

**3.** Your framework bites too – you say that morality must be situated in X because X state of affairs descriptively determines specific moral qualities about the external world If my framework is false so is yours.

**4.** Just because a framework commits a small logical fallacy doesn’t mean the entire thing is false. It means it *might* be false because a specific conclusion in it isn’t certain. This argument is just really bad defense.

## AT Death First

**1.** Cross apply **Carlsmith** - Numerous studies have found that people don’t respond rationally to the effect of punishment on crime rates. Even when people were told that deterrence would cause more crime they still remained dedicated to their view. People have moral outrage ingrained in their psychology and irrationally don’t care about future consequences.

**2.** People don’t know that rehab will minimize crime – my evidence indicates they think that locking people away is the best way to protect themselves from criminals. Even if in reality you protect them better what is relevant under my framework is what people *believe*. That negates.

**3.** Status quo checks – people are put in prison all the time and facilities are overcrowding. Means people in the squo want retribution and is empirical support for their disregarding of their own safety.

***[4.*** *Consequences are epistemically inaccessible.* ***Dorsey[[16]](#footnote-16):]***

*First, virtually anything we do, as Lenman notes, is likely to have [has] consequences that are identity-affecting, altering facts about who exists or will exist.7 But [such] the consequences of identity affecting actions, or most of them anyway, are invisible. As an illustration, Lenman considers the act of “Richard,” an early German conquerer, in sparing [a person] “Angie”—whose far distant ancestor turned out to be Adolf Hitler: The decision to spare Angie is an event with massive causal ramiﬁcations. It is highly plausible that almost all killings and engenderings and refrainings from these have similarly massive causal ramiﬁcations. These actions ramify in massive ways most obviously because they are, let us say, ‘identity-affecting’. These are actions that make a difference to the identities of future persons and these differences are apt to amplify exponentially down the generations. A very high proportion of identity-affecting actions are, it is enormously plausible, reliably subject to such massive causal ramiﬁcation.8 Given that any particular action—especially actions that are in some way or other identity-affecting—will have massive causal ramiﬁcations, we surely have no good evidence in the ex ante or ex post about the axiological quality of the consequences of our actions. That Richard’s sparing of Angie eventually resulted in the holocaust is certainly unknowable to Richard, Angie, or, indeed, anyone else. Second, some of the consequences of our actions are the result of that action playing a role in a causal system that is extremely sensitive to small changes. Lenman writes: “Indeed, it is arguably a very real possibility that very many actions that seem very insigniﬁcant are subject to massive causal ramiﬁcation. For some causal systems are known to be extremely sensitive to very small and [such as] localized variations or changes in their initial conditions.”9 Lenman cites the weather and ﬁnancial markets, systems that can alter signiﬁcantly with very small perturbations. These consequences are barred to even the most epistemically responsible agent. Hence a gigantic proportion of the consequences of our actions are invisible, and hence the moral valence of our actions is invisible as well. Furthermore, it would appear that this argument could go further. It needn’t be the case that any particular action actually had massive, unknowable causal ramiﬁcations for the moral valence of that action to be unknowable. Because we know that any action can have such causal ramiﬁcation, we are unjustiﬁed in maintaining any conﬁdence that the visible consequences of any particular action are the only consequences (even if, in fact, they are). Hence the argument from cluelessness seems to show, quite powerfully, that the moral valence of any action is simply unknowable, beyond our epistemic access. As Lenman writes: “The worry is not that our certainty is imperfect, but that we do not have a clue about the overall consequences of many of our actions. Or rather—for let us be precise—a clue is precisely what we do have, but it is a clue of bewildering insigniﬁcance bordering on uselessness—like a detective’s discovery of a fragment of evidence pointing inconclusively to the murderer’s having been seven feet tall. We may not be strictly without a clue, but we are virtually without a clue.*

## AT Proportionality

**1.** Cross apply **Carlsmith** – indicates that people don’t care if someone is completely culpable for their actions, e.g. a driver who commits manslaughter because they hit an oil slick still inspires feelings of outrage. People judge emotive significance by the act itself.

2. Arenella, P. (1992). Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability. UCLA Law Review, (39).

To paraphrase Strawson, part of the explanation for why the criminal law has linked legal to moral blame lies in how both our private and public blaming practices express as well as exploit our moral attitudes and values.4 9 The notion of moral responsibility conveys a fundamental theme in our moral culture concerning the connection between blame, responsibility, and punishment.50 Our legal blaming practices respect this moral responsibility principle in part because it reflects what Strawson described as our "participant- reactive" (p-r) attitudes of resentment and blame: "human reactions to the good or ill will or indifference of others towards us, as dis- played in their attitudes and actions."...These flaws in his account suggest that the primary value of his model is that it provides an interpretive guide to alternative mean- ings of our moral culpability judgements. Both our moral and legal blaming practices can be treated as social interpretive activities in which we construct accounts about the normative significance of human activity. Viewed from this perspective, questions about the meanings of moral culpability judgments and the purposes they serve are, at least in part, interpretive questions.

Criminal acts are more than just material crimes, they have an expressive dimension.

Garvey, Steven P. “Restorative Justice, Punishment, Atonement.” Utah Law Review No. 1, 303-317, 306-307.

But when my car is stolen, my house burned down, or my person assaulted through the intentional or reckless action of another, I suffer more than just material harm. Someone who engages in such conduct says something about his value or wroth compared to mine. He says, in effect “I’m better than you. Your rights are subordinate and secondary to my interests, and I’m free to run roughshod over them as I wish.” Crimes therefore convey a message of insult or contempt for their victims and criminal wrongdoers thus display an excessive pride of hubris in themselves. This expressive or moral injury is what constitutes the wrong of a crime, and the wrong of a crime is what makes it a crime.

## AT Emotivism = Subjectivism

**1.** Emotivism is distinct from subjectivism. **Jay[[17]](#footnote-17):**

The subjectivist thinks that ethics is to be analysed in terms of a person’s (the judger’s) feelings, attitudes or dispositions. The emotivists categorically deny that this is the way to go. Here, at some length, is Ayer explaining why: We reject the subjectivist view that to call an action right, or a thing good, is to say that it is generally approved of, because it is not self-contradictory to assert that some actions which are generally approved of are not right, or that somethings which are generally approved of are not good. And we reject the alternative subjectivist view that a man who asserts that a certain action is right, or that a certain thing is good, is saying that he himself approves of it, on the ground that a man who confessed that he sometimes approved of what was bad or wrong would not be contradicting himself. (Ayer, [1936/1946]: pp138-9) 10 [A]lthough our theory of ethics might fairly be said to be radically subjectivist, it differs in a very important respect from the orthodox subjectivist theory. For the orthodox subjectivist does not deny, as we do, that the sentences of a moralizer express genuine propositions. \*<+ His own view is that they express propositions about the speaker’s feelings. If this were so, ethical judgements clearly would be capable of being true or false. They would be true if the speaker had the relevant feelings, and false if he had not. \*<+ On our theory < in saying that tolerance was a virtue, I should not be making any statement about my own feelings or about anything else. I should simply be evincing my feelings, which is not at all the same thing as saying that I have them. (Ayer,[1936/1946]: p144) 13 the orthodox subjectivist does not deny, as we do, that the sentences of a moralizer express genuine propositions. \*<+ His own view is that they express propositions about the speaker’s feelings. If this were so, ethical judgements clearly would be capable of being true or false. They would be true if the speaker had the relevant feelings, and false if he had not. \*<+ On our theory < in saying that tolerance was a virtue, I should not be making any statement about my own feelings or about anything else. I should simply be evincing my feelings, which is not at all the same thing as saying that I have them. (Ayer,[1936/1946]: p144) Ayer’s notion of ‘evincing’ is, I think, extremely useful here.

## AT Emotivism = Skep

**1.** Emotivism still bestows ethical significance to truth statements. **Miller[[18]](#footnote-18):**

Ayer argues, as we shall see, that **although ethical judgements do not possess literal significance, it does not follow from this that they are nonsensical, or mere verbiage, because they can properly be said to possess some other sort of significance, emotive significance.**

**2.** Emotivism can still say that moral beliefs are truth-apt. **Van Roojen[[19]](#footnote-19):**

While this two component approach may have advantages when dealing with the role of moral terms in inferences and arguments (see discussion of the embedding problem below **they do.** And **speakers will make these predications only when they believe that they are true, so** that it seems that **moral judgments** will **express beliefs.**), it may be open to the objection that **the view is no longer a version of non-cognitivism**. Accounts of this sort **[Emotivism] do[es] not deny that moral judgments predicate properties** — in fact **they are committed to the claim that**

## AT Descriptive Contention Theory

**1. T –** every contention is descriptive about how thing occur in the world, or how we form moral claims. There’s ZERO ground or topic lit on both sides under your interpretation.

**2. T –** descriptive is most real world because it is literally that – an understanding of states of affairs and how they affect us.

**3. I meet –** you can turn the NC by offering a different interpretation of emotions e.g. sympathy or polls and weigh them against my offense.

**4. I meet** – the NC isn’t descriptive – it’s not making claims about how morality does work but how morality ought to be interpreted relative to the resolution.

**5.** This argument is stupid. Every proposition about anything is always descriptive in some manner – for example, when you vote aff you claim descriptively that the aff should win – but we don’t think it’s unfair for you to do so.

## AT Evolution is False

**1.** All qualified scientists confirm my argument. **Coyne[[20]](#footnote-20):**

The tenets of evolutionary theory are simple: **Life evolved, largely under the influence of natural selection; this evolution took a rather long time; and species alive and dead can be organized on the basis of shared similarities into a tree whose branching pattern implies that every pair of living species has a common ancestor Among genuine scientists., there is not the slightest doubt about the truth of these ideas**. In contrast to Egnor's claim, **the evidence for all of them is not only strong but copious--so much so that evolution has graduated from a scientific theory to a scientific fact.** My recent book, [Why Evolution Is True](http://whyevolutionistrue.com/), gives 230 pages of evidence for evolution--evidence from many areas of biology, including the fossil record, anatomy, biogeography and molecular biology. **My main problem in writing [a book to argue for it]** the book **was not deciding what to present, but what to leave out; I could easily have made it three times longer without even beginning to exhaust the data. There is so much evidence and so many kinds of evidence that one would have to be either willfully ignorant or blinded by faith to think otherwise**. (I leave it to the reader to judge to which category Egnor belongs.)

**[AT Second Law/Energy]**

**1.** This argument is dumb – it misunderstands what entropy means. The earth isn’t a closed system – the universe is, so evolution is possible because the decrease in energy occurs elsewhere in the universe.

**2.** The earth has a continued source of energy from the sun; your argument assumes that it would run out but that energy is sufficient to sponsor the complexity of evolution.

**3.** Scientific consensus proves this argument is false. **Oerter[[21]](#footnote-21):**

The second law of thermodynamics (the law of increase of entropy) is sometimes used as an argument against evolution. Evolution, the argument goes, is a decrease of entropy, because it involves things getting more organized over time, while the second law says that things get more disordered over time. So evolution violates the second law. **There are many things wrong with this argument**, and it has been discussed *ad infinitum*. A summary of the arguments on both sides can be found on the links at [link]. These discussions never seem to involve any numerical calculations. This is unfortunate, since a **very simple calculation shows that it is physically impossible for evolution to violate the second law of thermodynamics**. It is important to note that **the earth is not an isolated system: it receives energy from the sun, and radiates energy back into space**. The second law doesn't claim that the entropy of *any part* of a system increases: if it did, ice would never form and vapor would never condense, since both of those processes involve a decrease of entropy. Rather, the **second law says that the *total* entropy of the *whole system*must increase. Any decrease of entropy** (like the water freezing into ice cubes in your freezer) must be compensated by an increase in entropy elsewhere (the heat released into your kitchen by the refrigerator). A slightly more sophisticated form of the anti-evolution argument recognizes that the earth is not an isolated system; it receives energy from the sun. But, the argument goes on, the sun's energy only *increases* disorder. It speeds the processes of breakdown and decay. Therefore, even with an energy source, evolution still violates the second law.   For the earth, though, we have to take into account the change of entropy involved with *both* the absorption of energy from the sun *and* the radiation of energy into space. Think of the sun as a heat reservoir that maintains a constant temperature T1 = 6000 K. (I am using the absolute, or Kelvin, temperature scale.) That's the temperature of the radiating surface of the sun, and so it's the effective temperature of the energy we receive from the sun. When the earth absorbs some amount of heat, *Q*, from this reservoir, the reservoir loses entropy: [equation] On average, the earth's temperature is neither increasing nor decreasing. Therefore, in the same time that it absorbs heat energy *Q* from the sun's radiation, it must radiate the same amount of heat into space. This energy is radiated at a much lower temperature that is approximately equal to the average surface temperature of the earth, *T*2 = 280 K. We can think of space as a second heat reservoir that absorbs the heat *Q* and consequently undergoes an entropy increase. Since *T*1 is much larger than *T*2, it is clear that the net entropy of the two reservoirs increases: [equation] Even if it is true that the processes of life on earth result in an entropy decrease of the earth, the second law of thermodynamics will not be violated unless that decrease is larger than the entropy increase of the two heat reservoirs. Any astronomy textbook will tell you that the earth absorbs 1.1 x 1017 Joules per second of power from the sun, so in one year we get (1.1 x 1017 J/sec)x(365 days/year)x(24 hours/day)x(60 min/hr)x(60 sec/min) = 3.5 x 1024 Joules of energy from the sun. This corresponds to an entropy increase in the heat reservoirs of [equation] Just how big is this increase? For comparison, let's calculate the entropy change needed to freeze the earth's oceans solid. The heat energy involved is   *Q*= (latent heat of fusion)x(mass of ocean water) = [equation] Water freezes at 273 K on the absolute scale, so the corresponding entropy change is [equation] Comparing with the entropy increase of the two heat reservoirs, we see that this is a factor of (1.6x1024 J/K)/(1.2x1022 J/K) = 140 larger. Remember, though, that the number for the heat reservoirs was for one year. Each year, more entropy is generated. The second law will only be violated if all the oceans freeze over in about 140 years or less. **Now, the mass of all the living organisms on earth, known as the *biomass*, is considerably less than the mass of the oceans** (by a very generous estimate, about 1016 kilograms. **If we perform a similar calculation using the earth's biomass, instead of the mass of the oceans, we find that the second law of thermodynamics will only be violated if the entire biomass is somehow converted from a highly disorganized state** (say, a gas at 10,000 K) **to a highly organized state** (say, absolute zero) **in about a month or less. Evolutionary processes take place over millions of years; clearly they cannot cause a violation of the second law.**

# Cards

**Thus,** morality must be grounded in our emotive intuitions or it cannot be internally binding or guide action. **Haidt[[22]](#footnote-22):**

In the 18th century, however, English and Scottish philosophers (e.g., Shaftesbury. Hutcheson. Hume, and Smith) began discussing alternatives to rationalism. They argued that **people have a built-in moral sense that creates pleasurable feelings of approval toward benevolent acts and corresponding feelings of disapproval toward evil and vice**. David Hume in particular proposed that **moral judgments are** similar in form to aesthetic judgments: They are **derived from sentiment, not reason, and we attain moral knowledge by an "immediate** feeling and finer **internal sense**," not by a "chain of argument and induction" (Hume. 1777/1960, p. 2), His most radical statement of this position was that "we speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them"' (Hume. 1739-1740/I969. p. 462). The thrust of Hume`s attack on rationalism was that reason alone cannot accomplish the magnificent role it has been given since Plato. Hume saw reason as a tool used by the mind to obtain and process information about events in the world or about relations among objects. **Reason can let us infer that a particular action will lead to the death of many innocent people, but unless we care about those people, unless we have some sentiment that values human life, reason alone cannot advise against taking the action**. Hume argued that **a person** in full possession of reason yet **lacking moral sentiment would have difficulty choosing any ends** or goals to pursue and would look like what we now call a psychopath (Cleckley. |9551 Hume. |777/1960). Hume`s emotivist approach to ethics was not well received by philosophers. Kant’s (1785/1959) rationalist ethical theory! was created as an attempt to refute Hume. and Kant has had a much larger impact than Hume on modem moral philosophers (e.g.. R. M. Hare. 1981; Rawls. 1971). many of whom have followed Kant in attempting to deduce a foundation for ethics from the meaning of rationality itself.

**D’Arms and Jacobson[[23]](#footnote-23):**

First, it accords with the powerful and increasingly pervasive view that values depend in some way on the existence of beings to whom things matter. Perhaps, then, human values depend on human valuing, which is inextricably tied to affect, sentiment, and emotion. The second reason to look to the sentiments emerges from the debate over internalism, the view that there must be some internal (i.e., semantic or conceptual) connection between an agent’s judgment that an object is good, or an action right, and his tendency to choose or do it. While many philosophers are attracted to some kind of internalism, just what sort of internalist constraint is viable remains one of the most signiﬁcant outstanding problems in ethical theory.

Sympathy is a secondary feeling to the emotive outrage we have towards crime. Retribution is comparatively more consistent with emotive intuition. **Clark[[24]](#footnote-24):**

But, he points out, there are also *virtuous* **emotions** which **ground retribution, namely the "moral outrage"** that often is **inspired by** witnessing or contemplating flagrant **acts of wrongdoing** that cause suffering, **and the** often **appropriate sense of guilt when we** ourselves **do something wrong**. In both cases, we might feel that retributive punishment is fairly imposed on the offender, that it is *deserved*, whether the offender be someone else or ourselves. **Not to feel these emotions**, Moore says, **is to be morally defective, and** the virtue of **such feeling**s **is evidence for the truth of retributivism**, since virtuous feelings come with "good epistemic credentials" (147). As Moore says about guilt: "**Our feelings** about guilt thus **generate** a judgment that we deserve the suffering that is **punishment**. If the feelings of guilt are virtuous to possess, we have reason to believe that this last judgment is correct, generated as it is **by emotion**s whose epistemic import is not in question" (148). It is this **intuition of desert, generated by guilt and moral outrage**, Moore says, that makes it not only *permissible* to punish wrongdoers, but that **makes it morally *required* to punish them, even if no other desirable outcomes follow from retribution** (148, 154). So although retribution may indeed sometimes be inspired by despicable motives and emotions, for Moore that doesn’t undercut its valid basis in some virtuous moral sentiments. Assuming for the moment that Moore has indeed demonstrated the virtue and reality-revealing nature of some retributive emotions, what about sympathy, e.g., "**the sympathy we may feel for wrongdoers whose wrongdoing was caused by factors such as social adversity or psychological abuse during childhood**"? Moore writes: "There are three things to say about this range of moral experience. First, **the moral judgment it seems to support does not fit with the much larger set of judgments about responsibility that we make in daily life.** In seeking **the most coherent expression of our moral judgements** considered as a whole, **[means] *these sympathetic judgements*** *may simply* ***have to be discarded***. No area of human knowledge is perfectly coherent. Any systematic exposition of our sensory experience, for example, has to disregard certain visual experiences because they give us inaccurate information about the world…The same can be said of our sympathetic responses to disadvantaged criminals" (544, my emphasis). In other words, **to minimize conflict in our judgments, we must disregard the sympathies generated by the adversities undergone by offenders. Such sympathies are inconsistent with our more numerous and powerful retributive inclinations, and** furthermore they are "**inaccurate**" in some sense.

**Ferguson[[25]](#footnote-25):**

Throughout the history of ethical thought, philosophers have been unable to invest their ethical reasoning with the force of demonstration. Whether they derived the sanction for their moral judgements from the will of God, from reason, or from an appeal to consequences, the certainty of their conclusions were-- and remain--open to question. If we appeal to the will of God, how can we prove that we have, indeed, apprehended God's will accurately? How are we to persuade those who don't believe in God? What if someone else apprehends God's will differently? Reason doesn't fend much better. Many argue that reason cannot determine action, but even if we grant Kant's "categorical imperative," we can come to no agreement on its practical application. Finally, an appeal to consequences is equally fruitless. We can never know all the consequences of an action; and even if we could calculate them to the nth degree, we would still disagree about their value. Considerations such as these led [Sartre](http://www.kheper.net/topics/philosophy/Sartre.html) to the conclusion that human beings are "condemned to be free"-- that we must bear the weight of our choices without the consolation of God's approval and without the rational certainty of having done our duty in any absolute sense: there disappears with [God] all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it (Sartre 398). It seems the only thing we may know with certainty about our ethical judgements is how we feel about them and how we would like others to feel. Thus, emotivism would seem to hold some attraction for existentialists as well as for moral skeptics in the analytic tradition.{6}

**And,** ethical propositions are not factually distinct from non-ethical ones. Their only distinguishing characteristic is the emotive attachment of the speaker. **Ayer[[26]](#footnote-26):**

We begin by admitting that the fundamental **ethical concepts are unanalysable**, inasmuch **as there is no criterion by which one can test the validity of the judgements in which they occur**. So far we are in agreement with the absolutists. But, unlike the absolutists, we are able to give an explanation of this fact about ethical concepts. We say that the reason why they are unanalysable is that they are mere pseudo-concepts. **The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content.** Thus if **I say** tosomeone, **"You acted wrongly** in stealing that money,” I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, "You stole that money.” In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. **I am** simply **evincing my moral disapproval of it**. It is as if I had said, "You stole that money,” in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks. **The tone**, or the exclamation marks, **adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of** it is attended by certain feelings in **the speaker. If** now **I generalise my** previous **statement and say, "Stealing money is wrong,” I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning**-that is, expresses no proposition which can be either true or false. It is as if I had written "Stealing money!!”-where the shape and thickness of the exclamation marks show, by a suitable convention, that **a special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which is being expressed**. It is clear that there is nothing said here which can be true or false. Another man may disagree with me about the wrongness of stealing, in the sense that he may not have the same feelings about stealing as I have, and he may quarrel with me on account of my moral sentiments. But he cannot, strictly speaking, contradict me. For **in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong**, I am not making any factual statement, not even a statement about my own state of mind. **I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments.**

I contend that people emotionally prefer retribution because it appeases feelings of fear. **Bowes[[27]](#footnote-27):**

**Every time the media flashes provocative and appalling images of crime scenes across our television sets**, **we cringe in fear and ask ourselves** the dreaded hypothetical question: **What if someone tries to harm me, or** worse yet, **my family?** Pressure is put on **government**, and they **respond by passing laws that address the fear**, not the real problem. Most **people in society do not ask about any long-term effects of the “tough on crime”** bill; **they are just satisfied that their fears are temporarily extinguished and offenders will serve a lengthy prison term for their crimes.** As **the result of our emotional approach to deterring crime**, the U.S. **[is that the] prison population has swelled to** a staggering **2.5 million people**! Can you believe that the United States incarcerates more of its own people per capita than any other country in the world? For nearly 30 years, “lock ’em up and throw away the key” has been our stance on crime. **We have abandoned rehabilitation, even for nonviolent offenses, and made criminals second-rate citizens.** Unfortunately, despite the astronomical number of criminals behind bars and the billions of dollars squandered on warehousing them, crime is still devastating our communities.

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